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ABSTRACT. This article examines how civil-
ian-military relations in Turkey have trans-
formed from a guardianship of the military 
to civilian control. To this end, it covers the 
following issues. It surveys the ways in which 
the military has instituted its influence over 
civilians from the 1960 military coup up until 
the early 2000s. It elaborates major events and 
processes that took place during the 2000s un-
der the AKP governments. Then, the paper de-
scribes the reasons behind the failed coup at-
tempt of July 15, 2016, before concluding with 
a discussion of the implications of the coup 
attempt. There will be both immediate and 
long-term implications of the radical changes 
that the Turkish government made to civilian-
military relations and to the organizational 
structure of the armed forces after the recent 
failed coup attempt. 
KEYWORDS: civil-military relations, mili-
tary forces, guardianship, civilian control, coup 
d’etat, Turkey
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АННОТАЦИЯ. В статье рассматривает-
ся трансформация военно-гражданских от-
ношений в Турции на пути от опеки со сто-
роны армии к гражданскому контролю. Для 
того чтобы произвести подобный анализ, в 
статье рассмотрены следующие аспекты 
проблемы. Автор описывает пути, по ко-
торым проходила институционализация 
военного влияния на граждан, начиная от 
военного переворота 1960 г. и заканчивая 
анализом событий начала 2000-х гг. В рабо-
те приведен ряд важнейших событий и про-
цессов, протекавших в 2000-х гг., во время 
правления Партии справедливости и раз-
вития. Затем автор рассматривает при-
чины неудачи военного переворота 15 июля 
2016 г., что позволило также сделать вывод 
о влиянии попытки переворота в целом. 
Радикальные действия турецкого прави-
тельства станут причиной как серьезных 
краткосрочных, так и долгосрочных изме-
нений в гражданско-военных отношениях 
Турции, равно как и в самой организацион-
ной структуре военных сил после недавней 
неудачной попытки переворота.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: военно-гражданские 
отношения, армия, опека, гражданский 
контроль, военный переворот, Турция
ДЛЯ ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ: Кутай А� (2017)� 
От опеки к гражданскому контролю: как 
изменилась роль турецкой армии? Кон-
туры глобальных трансформаций: поли-
тика, экономика, право, 10 (3)� 68-82� DOI: 
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Introduction
The coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was 
startling� For the first time in history, an ex-
tension of a clandestine group, the Gulenists – 
officially described as the Fethullah Terrorist 
Organization (FETO) – intended to stage 
a coup� This event was shocking because no 
one could estimate the power of a secret or-
ganization within the army that has long been 
reputed of holding and protecting secular 
values� The failed coup attempt was not the 
first time in modern Turkish history that the 
military had planned to take over political 
power� However, the recent failed coup at-
tempt was remarkably different from previous 
experiences� The military has intervened four 
times since the commencement of democratic 
elections so as to restore peace and maintain 
secular values� But these interventions were 
not plotted by a secret organization or faction� 
The presence of such factions has always been 
inconceivable because Turkish officer corps 
have come to be trained in accordance with 
Kemalism and secular values (Jenkins, 2005)� 
Soldiers have seen themselves as being above 
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politics and political factions (Jacoby, 2003)� 
Instead, they have embodied a guardianship 
role in order to protect the ethos of modern-
ization and secularism from domestic and 
external threats (Hale, 2011)� Officers have 
not always followed the chain of command 
in their interventions1� But the overall in-
tegrity and discipline of the army has never 
been disrupted� So how has such a dramatic 
change occurred? How might the revolution-
ary changes adopted by the government after 
the failed coup influence the military and 
civilian-military relations? This paper aims to 
shed some light on this question�
To start with, civilian-military relations – 
not merely in the Turkish case, but in gener-
al – represent a paradox� As Feaver suggests, 
“The very institution created to protect the 
polity is given sufficient power to become a 
threat to the polity” (Feaver, 1999, p� 214)� 
Until recently, two fundamental works have 
dominated civilian-military relations: Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State and 
Morris Janowitz’s (Janowitz, 1960) The Profes-
sional Soldier� Huntington was a political sci-
entist, and he focused on how it was possible 
to establish civilian control over the military� 
Janowitz was a sociologist; he studied cultural 
aspects affecting the military identity and the 
relationship between soldiers and civilians� 
Huntington (Huntington, 1957) stated 
that there could be two methods of controlling 
the military: subjective or objective control� 
Subjective control refers to civilian command 
over the details of the organizational struc-
ture� Such control intends to make the armed 
forces more like a civilian agency, as it eradi-
cates the autonomy of the military by making 
promotions reliant on political contacts with 
the governing political party� In contrast, ob-
jective control aims to keep the civilian and 
military spheres separate by giving autonomy 
to the military in terms of steering their own 
organizational and bureaucratic structure� 
Such autonomy would be best achieved by 
professionalization in the army� 
Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960) argued that 
Huntington’s approach could best capture 
the changes in the military identity� On his 
account, the military could not be isolated 
from the values and norms of the rest of 
society� If society constantly changes, the 
military must also adapt to such changes� 
Because the military is a conservative in-
stitution, it might be difficult for the armed 
forces to follow the changes that take place in 
society� The solution, then, is to narrow the 
gap between the military and armed forces� 
One way of achieving this, for example, is to 
break the monopoly of military academies 
by creating Reserve Training Officer Train-
ing Corps at universities� 
Turkish armed forces gained autonomy in 
the 1950s after Turkey became a member of the 
NATO� Such autonomy strengthened the divi-
sion between the military and civilian spheres, 
as soldiers grew into an independent class, 
separate from the rest of the society� Soldiers 
could also have autonomy in controlling their 
own organizational structure� What is more, 
the Turkish military intervened in politics and 
exerted influence on the shape of governments� 
That is, professionalism did not bring about 
objective control of the military (Stepan, 1988)� 
Since 2002, Turkey has tended to control 
the military by following remedies addressed in 
the literature (Feaver, 1999, p� 225–230)� In line 
with Turkey’s bid for EU membership, the AKP 
governments accepted several constitutional 
and administrative restraints to curtail the legal 
grounds of the military power� However, these 
were not sufficient to prevent word of mouth 
spreading about the military discontent with 
the AKP governments during the 2000s and 
the onset of the July 15 coup attempt� There-
fore, the government adopted new methods� It 
deployed the military away from the political 
centres and cities� Civilians took measures to 
divide loyalties in the army by creating parallel 
chains of command� They removed the coast 
guard and gendarmerie from the military and 
included them as countervailing institutions to 
1  in 1960, the military did not follow the chain of command. 
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the interior ministry� In addition to these ef-
forts that focus on reducing the ability of the 
military, the government also intends to reduce 
the disposition of the military to intervene� 
This is to be achieved by recruiting personnel 
who are inclined to obey, or by changing the 
ethic of the military in military schools� New 
generation officer corps would thus be trained 
with the culture of obedience to civilians� In 
sum, the government wants to control the mili-
tary by following various established practices, 
yet without reducing the size of the army be-
cause the security threats remain� However, the 
new attempts appear to establish a more sub-
jective control over the army, eroding the or-
ganizational and civilianizing the armed forces 
by closing military courts, military hospitals, 
and military academies and schools� But how 
have civilian-military relations in Turkey trans-
formed from a guardianship of the military to 
civilian control? 
The paper begins with an overview of the 
ways in which the military has instituted its 
influence over civilians from the 1960 military 
coup up until the early 2000s� The next section 
elaborates major events and processes that 
took place during the 2000s under the AKP 
governments� Then, the paper describes the 
reasons behind the failed coup attempt of July 
15, 2016, before concluding with a discussion 
of the implications of the coup attempt�
Military Influence
How could the Turkish military influ-
ence politics? What explains the power of the 
Turkish armed forces (TAF)? What are the 
main characteristics of the Turkish military? 
We need to address these questions before we 
turn to the recent radical changes that took 
place during the AKP period and following 
the July 15 coup attempt� 
GUARDIANSHIP
The Turkish military established its self-
confidence and unchallenged power within 
a historical process� The political role of the 
military was primarily legitimated through 
its guardianship (Demirel, 2004)� The Turkish 
Republic was proclaimed after a war of inde-
pendence and the victorious Turkish military 
acquired substantial prestige in the eyes of 
the people since the early days of the republic 
(Jenkins, 2007)� The military became a cen-
tral element of the establishment alongside 
the bureaucracy in these early days� However, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the 
new regime, banned the officer corps from 
engaging with politics� Soldiers had to resign 
if they intended to take active roles in politics 
(Hale, 2011, p� 195)� 
Despite the new regime’s strict insistence 
on keeping soldiers out of the political process, 
moral and legal grounds for future military in-
terventions were established in this period� The 
Armed Forces Internal Service Law, accepted 
in 1935, stipulates: “the duty of the armed forc-
es is to protect and defend the Turkish home-
land and the Republic of Turkey, as determined 
in the Constitution” (Hale, 2011, p� 195)� This 
law, abolished in 2013, expressed the motto 
of the military’s guardianship role� Such a role 
was regularly used during the democratic tran-
sition period, with the army creating further 
legal and institutional prerogatives that gave 
soldiers control over civilians�
The officer corps was strictly loyal to the 
newly established regime and to its secular 
and modern reforms (Satana, 2011)� It had 
a self-authorized claim to protect the secu-
lar principles of the republic� But it would be 
incorrect to suggest that the armed forces in-
tervened in each case (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 
and 2007) merely to prevent the Islamization 
of the country� The primary motivation of the 
1960 takeover was to restraint the authoritar-
ian leanings of the elected government, the 
Democrat Party (Güney, 2002, p� 164)� The 
opponents of the Democrat Party, the Repub-
lican People’s Party (CHP), bureaucrats and 
officers corps, speculated that the government 
of the day was about to establish a dictator-
ship� The main reason for the 1971 and 1980 
interventions was the politically motivated vi-
olence in the country (Harris, 2011)� In 1971, 
the military forced the government to leave 
the office to a technocratic government� In 
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1982, the military itself took control in order 
to end the political violence between the left 
and right wing groups, and to end the political 
deadlock when the violence and the political 
conflict in parliament made the country un-
governable� In short, the primary aim of the 
military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980 
was to make the country governable� Secular-
ism has always been the central identity of the 
armed forces; however, it was not the driving 
force behind the military’s decision to act in 
the respective interventions�
In one particular case, the military in-
tervened politically to restore secularism in 
1997, on February 28 (Narlı, 2011, p� 221)� 
Political Islam, the roots of which date back 
to the 1970s, gained mass support during 
the 1990s as a response to the inability of the 
mainstream political parties to find a solution 
to growing economic problems (Harris, 2011, 
p� 209; Güney, 2002, p� 166–173)� Political 
Islam gained momentum while mainstream 
politics was eroding� While the coalition gov-
ernment, established between the centre left 
and right in the early 1990s, was losing sup-
port, the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as 
the mayor of Istanbul in 1994 as a candidate 
of the Welfare Party was a critical milestone� 
Erdogan founded the AKP as a successor to 
the Welfare Party, the party that was the target 
of the military intervention in 1997 and that 
was closed by the constitutional court�
The military takeover in 1980 had an un-
intended consequence� The military junta 
wanted to curb the influence of leftist ideolo-
gies and for this reason encouraged the flour-
ishing of a more conservative political move-
ment that brought together nationalist and 
religious elements under the so-called Turk-
ish-Islam synthesis (Kaplan, 2002)� Paradoxi-
cally, the guardians of secularism unleashed a 
very dynamic political movement that would 
determine the future of Turkish politics and 
that would guide a process that undermines 
their own political power and autonomy�
The military warned civilians again in 2007 
with the purpose of protecting secularism 
when the AKP planned to put forward Abdul-
lah Gul as a candidate for the presidency� The 
Chief in General, Yasar Buyukanit, warned 
the government and advised Mr� Gul to step 
back; even though a pious president may be 
tolerable, a first lady with a headscarf was in-
conceivable� The Chief in General may have 
intended to mobilize the secular masses with 
this act, similar to what soldiers had done in 
1997, in order to negatively influence the pub-
lic support of the AKP� But the opposite hap-
pened� The AKP called for an early election and 
it further increased its public support� It would 
not be wrong to define the election of Mr� Gul 
as president and the AKP’s second electoral 
victory as a critical turning point in civilian-
military relations in Turkey (Sarıgil, 2014, p� 
180)� With large support from the masses, and 
subsequently from disparate sectors of civil so-
ciety, the AKP was, then, more confident in its 
position against the military�
The failed coup attempt in 2016, which 
will be examined in detail below, was present-
ed by the plotters, the Gulenists, as a secular 
intervention� However, even in its early hours 
when it remained unclear which group in the 
armed forces organized the coup, the secu-
lar groups did not support the coup attempt� 
When President Erdogan called citizens to 
the streets in order to resist the plotters, many 
secular citizens joined the AKP supporters in 
order to protect democracy� It soon became 
apparent that it was not the Turkish army but 
an army within the army, a cabal of Gulenists, 
who were behind the coup attempt� 
LEGAL GUARANTEES AND SAFEGUARDS
The Turkish military was politically in-
fluential and has always seen itself as an ar-
biter of domestic political problems (Jacoby, 
2003)� However, it differed from praetorian 
militaries in the sense that it accepted the 
legitimacy of civilians, the rule of law, and 
democracy (Sakallioglu, 1997, p� 153)� Even 
though soldiers did not accept the right of 
civilians to be wrong, after each intervention, 
they returned to their barracks and left power 
to civilians� Nevertheless, solders left with 
exit guarantees that enabled them to control 
and influence the political field without hav-
ing to take direct control (Demirel, 2004)� 
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The key to the entrenchment of military in-
fluence over politics was the creation of the 
National Security Council with the 1961 con-
stitution (Harris, 2011, p� 205)� The council 
worked as a parallel executive organ under 
military control through which the soldiers 
could shape vital political issues, which are 
normally determined by civilians in democ-
racies (Sakallıoğlu, 1997)� The 1982 constitu-
tion enhanced the powers of the council, as 
the government was required to give priority 
to the council’s decisions (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, 
p� 153–154)� The council started working as a 
shadow government until its composition was 
significantly changed by the EU reform pack-
ages in 2003 and 2004 (Bayramoğlu, 2002)� 
PUBLIC SUPPORT
The military could maintain supremacy 
because both the society and civilians did not 
challenge this supremacy (Demirel, 2004, p� 
134)� The public image of the military was 
largely positive until the 1980 coup, and the 
armed forces were the most respected and 
trusted institution (Sarigil, 2015, p� 284)� The 
Turkish military, too, identifies itself with the 
nation� Political processes were perceived 
by soldiers to be corrupt, and political par-
ties and politicians were seen to serve their 
own interests (Sakallioglu, 1997, p� 156)� On 
the whole, politicians could not completely 
restore confidence among citizens� In con-
trast, the military was not corrupted� It was 
seen as representing the common good, and 
its organizational structure privileged merit 
and success� They were careful not to be as-
sociated with any ideology or specific section 
of society� The military tried to cultivate and 
maintain an image of being an institution 
above politics, which implied not supporting 
any political party or taking sides with a par-
ticular ideology (Jacoby, 2003, p� 673)� While 
in politics nepotism and favouritism were be-
lieved to be the norm, soldiers could success-
fully rely on this positive public image when 
they acted to correct the failures of civilians 
(Tachau, Heper, 1983)� 
However, the military isolated itself from 
the rest of society� Soldiers built their own 
residential areas and fenced them off� They 
created separate social activity centers, res-
taurants and summer camps (Narlı, 2000)� 
Despite such isolation, one cannot speak of 
any conflict between society and the soldiers� 
On the contrary, Turkish culture has many af-
finities to the military as an organization, and 
it embraces militaristic values (Cizre, 2004, p� 
11; Altinay, 2004)� However, Turkish culture 
is not monolithic, and identities (ethnic, re-
ligious and political) influence how people 
approach the soldiers� Sarıgil (Sarıgil, 2015) 
outlines some key factors that can determine 
different attitudes towards the military� While 
Turks have a pro-military attitude, Kurds have 
an anti-military attitude� Religious people, 
who also largely support the AKP, are more 
sceptical towards the political role of the mili-
tary� Meanwhile, the opposition parties, in-
cluding the Republicans (CHP) and national-
ists, hold a positive view of the military2�
The traditionally positive image of sol-
diers was hampered by the 1980 military in-
tervention and succeeding transitional mili-
tary junta that lasted for three years, because 
of the excessive use of violence and suppres-
sion of political opposition� The new constitu-
tion, written and ratified under the military’s 
control, was authoritarian (Isiksel, 2013)� It 
reinforced military supremacy by means of 
strengthening the executive power of the mili-
tary� The heyday of military supremacy over 
civilians was established after the 1980 mili-
tary takeover and lasted until the early 2000s, 
when the EU reforms were launched�
NATIONAL SECURITY
Another important factor that helped the 
entrenchment of the Turkish military’s influ-
ence in the political sphere was its power to 
define national security issues (Cizre, 2007)� 
2  the same research also finds that there is no strong evidence to suggest that military service reinforces militaristic culture and 
values in society.
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Civilians appeared to accept this power� The 
Turkish army went through a strict profes-
sionalization process as early as the 1950s 
with its membership of NATO� Professional-
ization, however, has not stopped the military 
from intervening in politics, as Huntington 
suggested� In contrast, the military claimed 
epistemological and organizational authority 
over security issues� The Cold War, domes-
tic turmoil and lasting political polarization 
helped legitimate the soldiers’ control over 
security issues until the 1980s� In the 1990s, 
Islamic movements and Kurdish groups were 
deemed two vital threats to the regime� 
The military resisted reforms to civilian-
military relations during the 1990s by justify-
ing the need for the securitization of domestic 
politics� Turkey’s exceptional situation resulted 
from the growing power of political Islam and 
the activities of the separatist terror of the PKK 
(Cizre, Çınar, 2003, p� 315)� The military did 
not hesitate to impose its own agenda of con-
trolling and correcting elected politicians, as 
security constituted the main political con-
cern� Civilians lacked the relevant knowledge 
and determination to govern the fight with the 
PKK� Politicians even invited soldiers them-
selves into the political arena; the conservative 
PM in the mid-1990s, Tansu Ciller, left fight-
ing the PKK entirely to the military� During 
the 1990s the military described itself as “a 
guarantee not only for the regime but at the 
same time of democracy, societal peace and the 
modern life style” (Cizre, Çınar, 2003, p� 314)� 
This background matters because the military 
gave up its power and privileged position in the 
Turkish political system as early as the 2000s by 
not openly resisting the AKP government and 
the move towards EU membership�
All in all, the military was autonomous 
but civilians were not� The Turkish military 
was protected from civilian interference; 
however, the opposite was not possible� Non-
expert civilians could not coordinate the or-
ganizational structure of the armed forces 
and determine security and defense policies� 
Indeed, no politician intended to change this 
situation until the 2000s, with one exception: 
a previous president, Turgut Ozal, appointed 
a military candidate as Chief in General and 
conflicted with the General Staff in terms of 
Turkey’s involvement in Operation Desert 
Storm (Narlı, 2011, p� 219)� However, the mili-
tary could still interfere in politics and eco-
nomics� Soldiers passed through a disciplined 
and well-organized education comparable to 
Western standards� They claimed to correct 
the failures of civilians (Jenkins, 2005)� Legal 
safeguards and coordination of the defense 
sector secured the autonomy of the military 
to decide on promotions, recruitment, and 
appointments in its organizational structure, 
as well as on the military budget (Sakallıoğlu, 
1997, p� 152)� However, the military’s auton-
omy was not restricted to its organizational 
side� Soldiers isolated themselves from the 
rest of society by building independent social 
facilities, including their own summer camps, 
restaurants, and recreational facilities (Narli, 
2000)� This isolation has damaged the im-
age of the military by depicting the army as 
a privileged class� What is more, the military 
also had economic investments and industrial 
facilities� The military held its own holding 
company, the Armed Forces Trust and Pen-
sion Fund (OYAK) (Akça, 2010, p� 5)�
AKP PERIOD
How did the AKP break the military’s in-
fluence? The AKP promised to build a better 
democracy, and such a promise meant ending 
the military influence over politics� Turkish 
people trusted the military as an institution 
but also wanted the right of civilians to decide 
their own future under a democratic system�
The AKP mobilized disparate groups with-
in society that demanded change (İnsel, 2003)� 
It managed to mobilize a coalition that brought 
together different sections of society with the 
aim of curbing the influence of the military� The 
motivations of these groups differed� Liberals, 
socialists, and conservative democrats primar-
ily focused on strengthening the liberal-demo-
cratic nature of the regime� On their account, 
civilian supremacy over the military must be 
coupled with the maintenance of rights and 
liberties� Religious groups, those which made 
up the backbone of the Islamist parties includ-
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ing the AKP, supported the reforms concern-
ing the establishment of civilian control over 
the military because the secular army did not 
tolerate any deviation from the secular norms 
that guided the public and social life�
The military has always been adamant 
about its role as guardian of the secular re-
gime throughout the republican period, since 
1923� But the so-called February 28 process 
in particular, referring to the military ultima-
tum that dissolved the centre-right (Dogru Yol 
Partisi) Islamists (Refah Partisi) coalition, had 
a dramatic effect on the Islamist groups� It is 
true that the non-traditional way of military 
interference through the use of threats of force 
was denied by many, including liberals, social-
ists, and other democratic groups� However, 
it was the Islamists who understood that it 
was not possible to converge with the military 
when they are in power� 
The AKP abandoned political Islam at 
the outset (Yavuz, 2006)� The founders of the 
AKP carefully declared the ideological motto 
of the new movement as conservative democ-
racy� The charismatic leader of the AKP party, 
Mr� Erdogan, allayed fears concerning the real 
political goals of the newly emerged party by 
promising to advance Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership (Hale and Ozbudun 2009)� Such 
a promise meant anchoring Turkish democ-
racy to EU norms including those concerning 
civilian-military relations (Cizre, 2007; Gür-
soy, 2011)� The success of the AKP here is that 
it has not defined the implementation of the 
EU reform packages as a challenge to the mili-
tary� There was no need for such a heroic chal-
lenge when the governing party could already 
take steps to weaken the political influence of 
the military (Caliskan, 2017, p� 104)�
In the 2002 elections, only two parties 
(AKP and CHP) could pass the 10 percent 
electoral threshold� The political stalemate of 
the 1990s alongside economic crises withered 
the mainstream political parties� In a two-
party parliament, the AKP could dominate 66 
percent of the seats� This supermajority could 
allow the government to pass fundamental 
constitutional amendments without having 
to consult the opposition group: the Republi-
cans� However, the AKP avoided any confron-
tation with either the opposition or the mili-
tary� Instead, the government concentrated on 
EU membership and economic reforms� 
Turkey’s EU membership bid must be seen 
as the most significant factor that changed 
the nature and future of the civilian-military 
relations� When Turkey started negotiations 
with the EU, Turkey’s legal and political sys-
tem were required to adapt to EU laws and 
norms� An important part of those norms 
concerned the democratic oversight of the 
military and security sector (Cizre, 2007, p� 
4)� The so-called Copenhagen criteria – first 
applied to the Central and Eastern European 
countries in their accession to the EU in the 
1990s – were also used by the EU in Turkey’s 
accession bid� The criteria required the estab-
lishment of the legal and institutional struc-
ture of a well-functioning liberal democracy 
and market economy in candidate countries� 
An important element of this condition con-
cerned civilian control over the military�
Accordingly, Turkey adopted vital politi-
cal reforms during the early 2000s in order to 
be granted full membership� These reforms 
curbed the military’s influence, among other 
things, by erasing the priorities of the Na-
tional Security Council from the constitution 
and by maintaining numerical supremacy of 
civilians over soldiers in the same council� 
Constitutional amendments also removed the 
administrative organ of the NSC (the NSC 
General Secretary)� Soldiers could no longer 
have representatives in the Council on Higher 
Education and the Higher Board of Radio and 
Television (Berksoy, 2013, p� 8)�
Despite all the reforms undertaken be-
tween 2002 and 2005, the civilian control 
of the military was not achieved to the EU’s 
standards� For instance, the Chief in General 
continued to report to the PM instead of the 
Minister of Defence� Nevertheless, the AKP 
managed to convince disparate groups in civil 
society and secular bureaucracy, and the mili-
tary maintained their skepticism on account of 
the party’s founding leaders’ associations with 
political Islam (Yavuz, Koc, 2016, p� 136)� The 
AKP broke the dominance of secularists and 
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Kemalists in the bureaucracy, which was seen 
as a traditional supporter of the military, or 
part of the establishment� Breaking the domi-
nance of secularists in the armed forces was 
more challenging� In such a context, it was true 
that the military was not content with the elec-
tion of a party with a background in political 
Islam� However, there were several phenomena 
that precluded the military intervention� 
The reforms eradicated the legal basis of 
the military’s influence� But supporting de-
mocratization packages and Turkey’s acces-
sion to the EU would perfectly comply with 
the modern and Western-oriented ethos of the 
military (Heper, 2011)� What is more, military 
intervention, or soldiers stubbornly resisting 
the EU accession process, would be too risky 
for the country because Turkey has already 
well integrated into the EU customs union and 
global markets� One reason for the military’s 
endorsement of the EU accession process, al-
beit half-heartedly, may be that the EU acces-
sion process would seal the ethos of modern 
Turkey’s goal of achieving the standards of the 
Western civilization� The possibility of joining 
the Western club, then, took precedence over 
the military’s desire to control politics and na-
tional security� All in all, the military had to 
adapt to the new environment� In this context, 
the military had neither the need nor the desire 
to intervene in politics� 
SLEDGEHAMMER-ERGENEKON
In 2008, the Turkish public was shocked 
when allegations arose concerning the exis-
tence of a secret criminal organization, Er-
genekon� It brought together people from 
various sectors of society, including journal-
ists, academics, and soldiers� The members of 
Ergenekon would create turmoil in society, the 
accusations suggested, and the chaos would 
create legitimate grounds for the military to 
plot a coup� While the surprise effect of this 
case was still fresh, the second historic case, 
the Sledgehammer, appeared in the media� A 
large number of soldiers were charged with 
planning an intervention in 2003� Those plans 
were only revealed in 2010 when a newspa-
per, Taraf, first began publishing stories about 
the plot with reference to some documents 
delivered to the newspaper in a suitcase� The 
public was stunned when the details came to 
light� For example, it was said that the plotters 
would create a chaotic atmosphere by bomb-
ing two mosques in Istanbul and shooting 
down a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean Sea� 
The officer corps, however, refuted accusations 
by suggesting that the document was simply a 
scenario being discussed in a military seminar� 
The cases were taken very seriously by 
the public as they promised to reveal coup at-
tempts, as well as uncovering past and present 
political criminal acts, which have been linked 
to the deep state, or a network of actors acting 
within the state (Aydınlı, 2009)� On the one 
hand, the era of military interventions could 
finally come to end when soldiers were sen-
tenced; on the other if the secret elements act-
ing within the state are removed, then it would 
be possible to create a more transparent state 
structure (Aydınlı, 2012)� Those hopes were 
quickly dashed when the police, working in 
harmony with some segments of the judiciary, 
started to select several reputed scientists, aca-
demics, and journalists at dawn� For instance, 
many condemned the way in which an elderly 
scientist and activist, Turkan Saylan, who had 
dedicated her life to the development of girls’ 
education, was detained�
The evidence related to these cases was not 
completely convincing, but only few would 
dare to criticize the incoherencies and falla-
cies within the prosecutor’s note from fear of 
being associated with the alleged Ergenekon 
terrorist organization (Jenkins� 2009)� These 
suspicions did not preclude the imprisonment 
of a large number of officer corps and civil so-
ciety actors, as well as a former Chief in Gen-
eral, Ilker Basbug� The military was silent and 
never questioned the legitimacy of the judicial 
process� However, in July 2011, the entire se-
nior command, including the Chief in Gen-
eral (Isik Kosaner) and the heads of the land 
forces, the navy, and the air forces, resigned 
in protest at the prosecution of officer corps� 
Kosaner said: “It has become impossible for 
me to continue in this high office, because I 
am unable to fulfil my responsibility to pro-
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tect the rights of my personnel as the chief of 
general staff”3� The military endorsed the su-
premacy of the civilians� 
When the conflict between the Gulenists 
and the AKP started in 2013, all the soldiers 
were acquitted in the early days of 2014� PM 
Erdogan and the supporters of the govern-
ment claimed that Gulenists were planning an 
insidious plot against the military� The consti-
tutional court would soon find that the cases 
were grounded on fabricated evidence� A po-
litical scientist describes these cases as func-
tioning “to anesthetize the political reflexes of 
the military in order to push them into mode 
of defense” (Caliskan, 2017, p� 106–107)�
GULEN MOVEMENT  
AND ON THE WAY TO THE FAILED COUP
Since 2013, the Gulen movement was of-
ficially defined as a terrorist organization, 
Fethullah Terör Organizasyonu (FETO)� The 
media began exposing the activities of the 
Gulenists� The invasion of the bureaucracy, 
the judiciary, and the police was no longer a 
secret� However, the extent and the power of 
the Gulenists in the army were underestimat-
ed, despite the military having long strived to 
prevent the growth of Gulenists in the army� 
Military intelligence had introduced stricter 
vetting procedures of military recruitment 
since the 1990s, the National Security Intel-
ligence defined the Gulen movement as a na-
tional security threat in 2004, and the military 
intended to expel suspected Gulen sympathiz-
ers from the armed forces� These measures 
were ineffective� All of which begs the ques-
tion: “How did Gulenists manage to infiltrate 
the most secular institution in the Republic?” 
(Yavuz, Koç, 2016, p� 137)�
During the AKP period, expulsions from 
the military on the grounds of engaging in 
regressive activities (or irtica) dwindled to 
almost nothing� The Commander-in-Chief in 
office from 2002 to 2006, Hilmi Ozkok, played 
a crucial role in preventing the expulsion of 
religious personnel4� Many members of the of-
ficer corps were not content with the encour-
aging attitude of Hilmi Özkök� Some officers 
intended to convince him to retire� This dis-
content with Özkök’s flexible attitude lasted 
throughout his tenure� However, there was no 
clear sign of any preparation for a military in-
tervention� It was unnecessary and too risky 
to commit such an act at a time when Turkey 
had made giant steps forward along the road 
to EU membership and was still struggling 
with an economic crisis�
The alleged alliance between Erdogan and 
Gulen eventually became a power struggle, as 
Gulenists demanded more power (Yavuz, Koç, 
2016)� The struggle between them first emerged 
in 2012, when the secretary of National Intelli-
gence, Hakan Fidan, was called by a prosecu-
tor in Istanbul in connection with the govern-
ment’s Kurdish policy� The government did 
not allow Fidan to be interrogated� Instead, it 
commenced a campaign against Gulenists� The 
government closed down private schools ran 
by the Gulen movement, took control over me-
dia affiliated with Gulenists, and imposed strict 
financial control over the companies owned by 
Gulen movement sympathizers� This campaign 
against the Gulenists aimed at eradicating their 
power, since education, media, and business 
formed three vital elements of the Gulen move-
ment� Gulenists reacted quickly� In December 
2013, Gulenist judiciary members and police 
started corruption probes against Erdogan’s 
family, four ministers and businessmen�
It was long suspected that the movement 
had an ambition to gradually infiltrate the state 
institutions� Those who supported the activities 
of the Gulen movement until the terrible July 
15 event argue that the movement was initially 
a liberal faith organization concentrating on 
education� But it later evolved into a clandes-
tine organization (Yavuz and Koc 2016: 137)� 
Alternatively, others suggest that the secretive 
3  bbC, 29 July 2011. turkey: military chiefs resign en masse. url: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-14346325 (ac-
cessed: 24.04.2017)
4  Jenkins g. Post-Putsch narratives and turkey’s Curious Coup. url: http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-
articles/item/562-post-putsch-narratives-and-turkeys-curious-coup.html (accessed: 19.04.2017)
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agenda has always been a part of the move-
ment, but only a few knew of its real face�
The movement has an opaque, onion-
like structure, composed of three layers5� At 
the core lies an inner circle of utterly dedi-
cated members to whom the secret goals of 
the movement were revealed� The core circle 
was guiding and controlling the global reach 
of the movement in communication with Gu-
len� They were aware of their privileged po-
sition in the movement, but they also knew 
that secrecy was fundamental to achieve their 
loosely and mysteriously defined objective of 
delivering service (Hizmet) to a sacred ideal�
The second circle focused on education 
and worked to occupy bureaucratic positions 
within the state bureaucracy� They could do 
this not so secretly during the AKP period� 
However, Gulenists encountered strong re-
sistance in one of those institutions: namely, 
the military� The second circle, which also 
includes members from business and the 
media, was also composed of loyal and pi-
ous Gulenists who were indoctrinated by the 
teachings of Gulen� However, they were less 
privileged in their access to Gulen and to the 
secrecies of the movement�
The third circle was composed of sympa-
thizers of the movement� They did not nec-
essarily work for the purpose of Hizmet, but 
rather appreciated the façade of the move-
ment� Many in the third group were not even 
religious� The movement approached celebri-
ties to enhance their popularity and invited 
reputed names to engage in their activities�
Gulenists had meticulously but insidi-
ously planned to penetrate into the bureau-
cracy and take control over the state from 
within� Gulenists initially achieved control 
over the police academy� Private tutorial 
schools and other private schools run by the 
movement, expropriated by the government 
after the failed coup of July 15, were crucial 
recruitment sites for the movement� Many of 
these students, having being indoctrinated by 
the Gulenist ideology of so-called hizmet, or 
service, held central bureaucratic or judicial 
positions in the state� Meanwhile, the move-
ment directed its student followers, mainly 
from the middle or lower-middle classes, to-
ward military high schools or military acad-
emies� Gulenists in the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary opened the way for cleansing secular 
or Kemalist officers from the military by plot-
ting the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases6� 
Gulenists in the army rapidly replaced these 
officers and organized the failed coup attempt� 
The failed coup of 15 July 
Since 2013, numerous Gulenists have al-
ready being cleansed from the police and judi-
ciary (Milan 2016)7� The government was also 
planning to expel numerous Gulenists from 
the military before August 2016� There is no 
doubt that the coup attempt was organized 
by Gulenists, and the failed “kamikaze coup 
attempt” of Gulenists was a reaction to pos-
sible expulsions8� Some argue it is likely that 
5  Şakul K. bir sPin şebeke örneği olarak gülen cemaati: sarımsak ve soğan demetlerinden bir öbek. url: http://t24.com.tr/yaz-
arlar/kahraman-sakul/bir-spin-sebeke-ornegi-olarak-gulen-cemaati-sarimsak-ve-sogan-demetlerinden-bir-obek,15139 (accessed: 
21.04.2017)
6  arango t. turkish leader disowns trials that helped him tame military. url: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/europe/
turkish-leader-disowns-trials-that-helped-him-tame military.html (accessed: 17.04.2017)
7  see: gurcan m. What went wrong with turkey’s Whatsapp coup. url: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-
coup-attempt-basic-cause-was-premature-birth.html (accessed: 15.04.2017); gurcan m. Why turkey’s coup didn’t stand a chance. 
url: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-kamikaze-coup-attempt-fails.html (accessed: 15.04.2017); gursel 
K. turkey’s failed Coup reveals army Within an army. url: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-at-
tempt-shows-army-within-army.html (accessed: 15.04.2017); tol g. mainzer m., ekmekci, Z. unpacking turkey’s failed coup: causes 
and consequences. 2016. url: http://www.mei.edu/content/article/unpacking-turkey-s-failed-coup-causes-and-consequences 
(accessed: 17.04.2017); filkins D. turkey’s thirty-year coup: did an exiled cleric try to overthrow erdoğan’s government. url: http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup (accessed: 17.04.2017)
8  Özkan, b. turkey’s lamikaze coup attempt: why now and what next? url: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/behlal-azkan/turkey-
coup_b_11033324.html. (accessed: 17.04.2017)
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other groups also joined the Gulenists either 
to advance their careers, or because they were 
threatened to do so or merely wanted to top-
ple the government� 
The coup failed because it did not follow 
the chains of command� The military com-
mand did not support the coup; only a few field 
units supported the coup attempt� The com-
mander of the first army in Istanbul, General 
Ümit Dündar, condemned the coup at an early 
stage� His statement made it clear that the coup 
attempt did not find support in the top eche-
lons of the military� When he straightforwardly 
condemned the coup attempt, it was still not 
possible to hear news from the Chief in Gen-
eral, Hulusi Akar, and a group of other higher 
ranking officers� Later in the night, it became 
apparent that senior commanders were held 
captive in an airbase in Ankara� Amid such 
chaos, General Dündar invited Erdogan to 
Istanbul, promising to protect him from the 
coup putschists� He kept his promise� Erdogan’s 
appearance on TV via Facetime on the night 
of July 15 and his call on citizens to resist the 
coup raised the morale of the people� For the 
first time in history, society stood against the 
soldiers in a coup attempt� 
In addition, the failed coup was immedi-
ately condemned by all political parties� Several 
parliamentarians ran to the parliament building 
and stayed there when it was being bombed by 
a F16� It was obvious that the coup was doomed 
to fail as putschists could only mobilize a mi-
nor section of the army� The plotters started the 
coup attempt on Friday night at 22:30, earlier 
than was planned, by blockading the Bosporus 
Bridge� They did not block Internet access or 
media broadcasts� They calculated to induce 
the sentiments of the opposition groups so as to 
create a larger social support for their attempt� 
The coup plotters presented themselves in a 
Kemalist image� They described themselves as 
the Peace at Home Council, a reference to Ke-
mal Ataturk’s motto, and in their list of griev-
ances they gave the reason for the coup as being 
the government’s anti-secular policies� But they 
should have known that bombing the national 
parliament would be seen as an appalling act by 
all sections of society� The use of violence by the 
putschists against the people further reinforced 
the people’s spirit of resistance� At least 242 
people died and more than 1,000 were injured� 
All in all, it was apparent that the coup attempt 
was not well-thought out or well-implemented� 
The coup attempt was brought under con-
trol during the early hours of July 16� The gov-
ernment was swift in its response� More than 
42,000 military personnel, including high-
ranking officers, have either been detained or 
dismissed due to their connections to the Gu-
len movement� It was the first time that a civil-
ian government could expel soldiers without 
having to consult the council (Gurcan, 2017)� 
Almost 40 percent of the Turkish army’s gen-
erals and admirals were arrested; the Chief in 
General and the commanders of the land forc-
es, navy, and air forces kept their positions� A 
huge number of people were also expelled from 
the judiciary, police, and education posts� The 
Gulenists’ private schools and universities were 
closed down� The government took control 
over these schools along with the businesses 
that were run by Gulen’s associates� 
The government also took revolutionary 
steps in changing the legal structure of the ci-
vilian-military relations and the institutional 
and organizational structure of the military� 
A series of laws that were adopted in line 
with the EU accession bid brought significant 
changes in legal and institutional terms� The 
electoral victory of the AKP in 2007 follow-
ing the Chief in General’s disapproval of the 
AKP’s presidential candidate, Abdullah Gul, 
was a notable turning point, as it gave the 
government crucial power vis-à-vis the mili-
tary� The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases 
weakened the institutional structure of the 
armed forces� But the implications after July 
15 on the military cannot be compared with 
any of these events� 
The government, adamant about main-
taining civilian control of the army, took 
revolutionary steps in restructuring the army 
by decrees that were issued during the state 
of emergency (Gurcan, Gisclon, 2017)� The 
Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard were taken 
under the full control of the interior ministry� 
Military high schools were closed� The pres-
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ent military academies will be replaced by a 
National Defense University and will operate 
under the Ministry of Defense� The civilian 
members of the military have been increased 
in the Supreme Military Council� The Land 
Forces, Naval Forces and Air Force commands 
were brought under the control of the Minis-
try of Defense� The General Staff, according 
to the new constitutional amendment, will be 
represented by the presidency� Furthermore, 
the government has taken control of all of the 
military’s business enterprises�
Concluding Remarks
The officer corps is also now more diverse 
in terms of their religious commitment, ideas 
about secularism, and Turkey’s foreign policy 
options� Gurcan (Gurcan, 2017), who conduct-
ed recent interviews with military personnel, 
helps us understand cleavages in the military� 
His findings suggest that military elites fall into 
three categories: (1) those who would not hesi-
tate in exploiting the capabilities of the armed 
forces for their own personal benefits (symbi-
onts); (2) those who merely try to advance their 
career opportunities without following a co-
herent worldview (pragmatists); and (3) those 
who want to change the institutional structure 
of the armed forces (reformists)�
There are different worldviews among 
military elites such as conservatives, Atlanti-
cists, neo-nationalists, and Eurasianists� Con-
servatives want to minimize the influence of 
globalization in the military� They are often 
religious and intend to restore a sphere of 
influence in Turkey’s neighboorhood by fol-
lowing a neo-Ottoman worldview� Conserva-
tives are not interested in learning a foreign 
language or staying abroad for the purpose of 
their career development� Atlanticists adopt a 
worldview that places Turkey’s future within 
NATO in close partnership with the US� In 
contrast to conservatives, they are better edu-
cated, and know foreign languages� 
Neo-nationalists, like conservartives, are 
also critical of the implications of globaliza-
tion in the military� But they want to preserve 
the traditonal Kemalist ideology and secular 
position of the armed forces� Eurasianists 
have a good command of foreign languages; 
however, they strive to follow a more inde-
pendent foreign policy� This might mean 
adopting an anti-American attitude and mov-
ing closer to Russia when necessary (Gurcan, 
2017, p� 9–10)�
Many thought that the coup attempt would 
foster a Eurasianist turn in the military, which 
meant finding a new security alliance beyond 
that of the Western and NATO bloc� An im-
mediate effect of the coup attempt was the rise 
of anti-Western and anti-American attitudes 
in society9� The government viewed the US, 
NATO, the EU and European countries (par-
ticularly Germany) as either plotters or sup-
porters of the failed coup� They were harshly 
criticized by Erdogan and by the media that 
supports the AKP� In their account, Western 
countries do not want a powerful Turkey; 
therefore, a more independent foreign policy 
should be sought� Options involving greater 
cooperation with Russia and China have be-
come more pronounced� 
There will be both immediate and long-
term implications of the radical changes that 
the Turkish government made to civilian-
military relations and to the organizational 
structure of the armed forces� It is likely that 
the changes are meant to divide loyalties in 
the military by placing land forces, air forces, 
and the navy under the Ministry of Defense� 
Civilians intend to establish subjective control 
over the military� But they will do so at the ex-
pense of breaking the chain of command in 
the army� A related consequence of this is that 
the military may become more politicized as 
their promotions will be determined by politi-
cians� Considering also that civilians lack the 
necessary technical knowledge, there may be 
some problems during the transition process�
9  gürcan m. How the post-coup purges depleted the turkish military. url: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 2016/09/
turkey-military-needs-two-year-fill-ranks-emptied-bypurge.html (accessed: 23.04.2017)
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